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The Establishment of 
the China and Southern Bank and the Southern Warehouse Company: 
In Relation to the Bank of Taiwan’s Southward Strategy with Overseas Chinese 
from the 1910s to the 1920s 
 
Ryoichi HISASUE 
Institute of Developing Economies, Japan 
 
Abstract: This paper elucidates how the Bank of Taiwan (BOT, 台湾銀行) tried and failed to 
approach the market between South China and Southeast Asia in the 1910s and 1920s through an 
analysis of a brief history of two affiliate companies: the China and Southern Bank (CSB, 華南銀
行) and the Southern Warehouse Company (SWC, 南洋倉庫). Under political and economic trends 
of the Southward Movement (南進論) of the 1910s, the BOT tried to enter South China and 
Southeast Asia by themselves but recognized the difficulties, and formed an alliance with Overseas 
Chinese. Therefore, the CSB and SWC, which were established in 1919 and 1920, respectively, to 
promote economic cooperation with Overseas Chinese to facilitate market entry in the south by 
Japanese capitals. However, both companies faced managerial difficulties upon development in the 
early 1920s. 
 
Keywords: the Bank of Taiwan; the China and Southern Bank; the Southern Warehouse Company; 
Southward Movement; Financial history; Economic history. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper elucidates how the Bank of Taiwan (BOT) tried and failed to approach the 
market between South China and Southeast Asia in the 1910s and 1920s through an analysis 
of a brief history of two affiliate companies: the China and Southern Bank (CSB) and the 
Southern Warehouse Company (SWC).1 
The BOT was established by the Japanese government in 1899. As a central bank and 
development bank of Taiwan, they provided not only general banking services, but also 
engaged in note issues, development finance, and bond underwriting. On the other hand, 
the BOT was specified in the ambitious business development plan in the prospectus of the 
BOT Act which said they would expand market territory to Mainland China and Southeast 
                                                        
1 For an overview of the BOT, see the BOT ed. 1910, 1916, 1919, 1939; EOBOTH ed. 1964. For a detailed 
discussion, see Namikata 1985; Ashihara 1986; Ito 1989; Sunaga 2005; Yokoi 2005; Hisasue 2012, 2017. For 
the CSB, see Hisasue 2010, 2015. For the SWC, see SWC 1936 and Ishihara 1970.  
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Asia as a financial pillar for Japanese economic expansionism.2 
Under political and economic trends of the Southward Movement in the 1910s, the BOT 
tried to enter South China and Southeast Asia by themselves but recognized the difficulty. 
Therefore, they formed an alliance with Overseas Chinese who controlled commercial 
networks in the region, and established affiliate companies as joint ventures with them. The 
CSB and SWC, which were established in 1919 and 1920, respectively, to provide financial 
and logistics services for both Japanese and Overseas Chinese customers, and to promote 
economic cooperation with Overseas Chinese to facilitate market entry in the south by 
Japanese capitals. 
However, the BOT fatally miscalculated the reality of their “partnership” with the 
Overseas Chinese, and could not create any actual business opportunities or synergistic 
effects in their joint ventures. Meanwhile, the BOT’s rapid expansionism failed in the early 
1920s due to the serious economic depression after the First World War, and they 
temporarily closed their doors in 1927. Moreover, due to weak corporate governance, lack of 
sufficient support from the BOT, and a depression in South China and Southeast Asia, both 
companies faced managerial difficulties upon their development in the early 1920s. Their 
relationship gradually broke down and they separated in the late 1920s. 
    First, in chapter 2, we start with the origin and background of the BOT’s southward 
strategy, then in chapter 3, we describe the story behind the failed Ken-en Bank (軒轅銀行) 
project that lasted from 1912 to 1915. In chapters 4 and 5, we examine detailed stories about 
the establishment of the CSB and SWC, then describe their limitations and restructuring in 
chapter 6, and find the reasons behind the structural problems of both companies in chapter 
7. In the final chapter, we describe the changing relationships among the BOT, CSB, and 
SWC in the 1920s and 1930s.  
 
2. Background of the southward strategy 
As a result of the Japanese-Qing War (日清戦争), the Qing Dynasty (清朝) ceded the 
island of Formosa to Japan in 1895. For Japan, this island was not only a new colony of the 
empire, but also a strategic base for expanding its power to South China and Southeast Asia. 
Therefore, the BOT, which was established in 1899, added their mission in the prospectus of 
the BOT Act which stated that the BOT was not only a central bank and development bank 
in Taiwan, but also an international bank which serviced both South China and Southeast 
Asia as a financial pillar of Japanese economic expansionism. 
However, at the first stage, the BOT had to establish a stable business model as the 
central and development bank in the colony, and its overseas expansion was relatively slow 
                                                        
2 BOT 1910, 3.  
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and limited until 1907. They only opened four overseas branches and agencies such as Amoy 
(厦門, 1900), Hong Kong (香港, 1903), Foochow (福州, 1905), and Swatow (汕頭, 1907). 
These were all located in South China because of the policy of the Taiwan Governor’s Office 
(TGO, 台湾総督府) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF, 大蔵省). The TGO recognized 
that Taiwan is an advance base to make an approach on Mainland China, especially in the 
southern part of China, as a new frontier. The MOF had intended to avoid unnecessary 
competition in the Chinese market between the BOT and the Yokohama Specie Bank (YSB, 
横浜正金銀行). Therefore, the MOF geographically drew a dividing line between the 
Yangtze River (揚子江) and the BOT, which was in charge of the southern part, then 
between the YSB, which was in charge of the northern part. 
Taiwan succeeded in realizing a fiscal balance in 1905 and a favorable trade balance in 
1907. As a reflection of their macro-economic growth in Taiwan, the BOT established a 
stable business model and saw financial results. Subsequently, the BOT carried its business 
development into further stages for its outer expansion. However, Kazuyoshi Yagyu (柳生一
義), the second president of the BOT, was a man who favored prudent and thorough 
preparation. He ordered detailed research about general information, markets, and potential 
businesses in Asia. This project covered micro and macroeconomics, socio/political 
considerations, and a wide geographical distribution. The research began around 1907, and 
the research division was officially established in 1912; they subsequently published more 
than 350 reports. 
In the first half of the 1910s, the BOT started full-scale expansion to overseas markets. 
The branch and agency network was obviously expanded to locations outside of Taiwan such 
as Canton (広州, 1910), Shanghai (上海, 1911), Singapore and Jiujiang (九江, 1913), 
London (1914), and Hankow (漢口) and Surabaya (1915). Geographically, the network 
extended from Mainland China to Southeast Asia.  
However, at this stage, the BOT had focused on and was committed to business 
operations in Mainland China including trade settlements, the issuing of promissory notes, 
and syndicate loans. It was noteworthy that President Yagyu was personally interested in the 
Chinese market. He released his conceptual plan for the Meiji Bank (明治銀行) to be part of 
Manchurian economic development in 1907, and also planned and attempted to implement 
currency reform in China in 1911, which was based on the circulation of silver yen coins and 
yen promissory notes.3 On the other hand, he encouraged the establishment of the Chunichi 
Jitsugyo (中日実業) in 1913 as an investment vehicle to China. Yagyu also released another 
conceptual plan for the Nisshin Bank (日清銀行) in January 1915 as a joint venture banking 
                                                        
3 However, the circulation of silver yen coins had been decreasing after its peak in 1918. 
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institution using local Chinese capital.4 
Another major target for outer expansion was the area between South China and 
Southeast Asia, which was connected by Overseas Chinese business networks. In this area, 
major European banks had provided financial services to local merchants directly and 
indirectly since the late 19th century. The BOT tried to adopt their business model and take 
over their market share. Yagyu mentioned his ambitions for a southward strategy: 
 
If it is impossible for the BOT to expand its business operations in the south because we 
have “Taiwan” in our name, so we should not hesitate to remove or change it. Under the 
current situation, and given our duty, there is no room to grow if we are stuck on this 
island with nothing to do about it.5 
 
The turning point was the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Many European 
banks were involved in the economic turmoil which undermined the smooth conduct of 
business operations in Asian markets. This situation was a golden opportunity for the BOT 
because it created a huge space in the existing market for them to enter, so the BOT 
significantly expanded their business in the south. Yagyu imagined a tripod structure based 
on the areas of Taiwan, overseas, and Mainland Japan. Within this structure, Taiwan was a 
linkage point to the greater Japanese economic area from Northeast to Southeast Asia. He 
enthusiastically believed that this was the manifest destiny of the BOT. It was also linked to 
the popularity of the Southward Movement in Japan, which sought economic opportunity in 
the south as a reflection of outer expansionism. 
 
3.  The Ken-en Bank project 
Under the political and economic trends of the Southward Movement, the BOT started 
various kinds of new businesses in Southeast Asia. One symbolic example was a joint venture 
project for a banking business called the Ken-en Bank, which aimed at collaborating with 
Overseas Chinese business networks to cultivate local business in Southeast Asia.  
The original proposer of this project was Quek Chun-yong (郭春秧), a successful tea and 
sugar trader in Semarang, Java. He was born in China’s Fujian (福建) province and moved to 
Java with his uncle around 1878. His commodity trading business gradually expanded, 
especially with tea exports from Taiwan and sugar exports from Java. He gained Japanese 
                                                        
4 It was realized as the Chunichi Bank (中日銀行, opened in Henan province in 1917) and the Chuka 
Waigyo Bank (中華滙業銀行, opened in Beijing in 1918). However, many parts of the loans turned out to be 
non-performing, and joint ventures were also forced to restructure or liquidate in the late 1910s. 
5 Hekiyokai ed. 1918, 304. 
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citizenship in 1895 and had close connections with Japanese diplomats in Java. Since 1912, 
Quek Chun-yong and his partners discussed setting up a western style bank under the name 
of Ken-en Bank in Java, but could not raise the statutory minimum capital because of serious 
struggles with his business competitor Oei Tiong-ham (黄仲涵).  
Therefore, Quek Chun-yong and his close associate Kazue Tsutsumibayashi (堤林數衞)6 
tried to borrow sufficient funds from the BOT and made contact with Goji Ukita (浮田郷次), 
the Japanese consul in Batavia in May 1913. The details of the Ken-en Bank project are as 
follows: 1) the head office was located in Semarang; 2) potential investors were 47 Overseas 
Chinese with 1.21 million guilders; and 3) the total amount of potential loans from the BOT 
was 500,000 guilders for three years at 5% or lower annual interest. 7  Ukita reacted 
positively, even regarding the trouble between Quek Chun-yong and Oei Tiong-ham, and 
sent a letter to the general manager of the BOT’s Singapore branch to consider the 
feasibility of this project.8 
Through their negotiations, Quek Chun-yong accepted the conditions of the BOT such 
as 6% annual interest rate. In June 1913, the policy bureau chief of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA, 外務省) in Tokyo sent an official letter to BOT President Yagyu to ask for 
support for the project.9 However, the project was suspended in September because of an 
escalation in the serious power struggle between Quek Chun-yong and Oei Tiong-ham in 
Java.10 
Meanwhile, this project stimulated President Yagyu and Vice President Kojyuro 
Nakagawa (中川小十郎), who were strong supporters of the Southward Movement. 11 
Therefore, the BOT continuously researched the feasibility of a joint venture opportunity 
with Overseas Chinese. They published a detailed report titled “Overseas Chinese (Chinese 
Immigrants) in Southeast Asia with a Report on Their Remittance Activities” in December 
1914. In the conclusion of this report, the BOT suggests a potential business plan with 
                                                        
6 Tsutsumibayashi moved to Taiwan in 1895 where he worked as a jailer and studied the Fujian dialect. He 
met Quek around 1897 and started to work for his trading firm. Their relationship was like that of a 
master-apprentice, and Tsutsumibayashi established his trading company Nanyo Shokai (南洋商会) in Java 
in 1909, which was strongly supported by Quek. 
7 MOFA 1913.5.13.  
8 MOFA 1913.5.13. 
9 MOFA 1913.6.9. 
10 MOAC 1915.3.31. 
11 Nakagawa was an enthusiastic Southward Movement activist and stated his opinion about the role of the 
BOT: “We should remember the function of Taiwan, which is not being the far part of the Empire, but a 
stepping stone for our economic expansion toward South China and Southeast Asia. We need to reconsider 
our duty as a financial institution to reach a more advanced level.” (Jiji Shinpo 1923.1.4.) 
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Overseas Chinese as follows; 1) unite leading Chinese merchants in South China and 
Southeast Asia, then establish Overseas Chinese banks in Surabaya, Batavia, Semarang, 
Bangkok, Saigon, Penang, and Manila; 2) the BOT will accommodate these banks with 
sufficient funding and accept their remittance orders; and 3) the BOT will invest in these 
banks as a shareholder and send directors to manage its banking operations. 
During the same period, the BOT’s business operations in Mainland China faced 
difficulties and they needed to find opportunities in other overseas markets. Meanwhile, 
because of the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, many European banks were 
involved in economic turmoil, which undermined the smooth conduct of business operations 
in Southeast Asia. In line with this background, the BOT restarted negotiations with Quek 
Chun-yong to establish the Ken-en Bank.  
In January 1915, Taishiro Mizuno (水野泰四郎), who was in charge of opening the 
Surabaya agency, met with Quek Chun-yong and recommended that he restart negotiations 
for a joint venture project.12 A few days later, Quek Chun-yong met with Secretary Kinji 
Nagamitsu (長満欽司) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (MOAC, 農商務省), 
and revealed his positive response to the offer from the BOT.13 Because of the war’s 
outbreak and soaring sugar prices, Quek Chun-yong earned nearly 1.5 million guilders profit 
from commodity trading, which provided him with the necessary capital to establish the 
bank.14 In February, Quek Chun-yong sent a new proposal to the BOT which offered equal 
investment joint ventures with 2 million guilders.15 In April, Etsuji Yanagi (柳悦耳), new 
general manager of the Surabaya agency, officially started negotiations with Quek 
Chun-yong and sent a report to the head office in Taipei in May which said, “It would be 
better to accept Quek’s offer and establish the Ken-en Bank in Java first, then set up other 
banks and expand businesses around Southeast Asia and South China.”16 Yanagi also 
mentioned that the BOT should appoint Chinese directors in name only, and that the 
Japanese would have to be in charge of management.   
However, the Taipei head office and Tokyo office had a clearer and grander vision for a 
joint venture with Overseas Chinese. They hoped to establish the Greater Overseas Chinese 
Bank (GOCB, 大華僑銀行), which would rally and unite leading Chinese merchants in 
Southeast Asia and South China. In May 1915, an anti-Japanese boycott movement began in 
Java, and the BOT gradually lost interest in the Ken-en Bank project. In July, Yanagi met 
                                                        
12 BOT 1915.2.12. 
13 BOT 1915.2.12; MOAC 1915.3.31. 
14 BOT 1915.2.12. 
15 BOT 1915.2.12. 
16 BOT 1915.5.8. 
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with Quek Chun-yong and told him that the BOT’s first priority was to establish the GOCB 
and only allow investments of 200 thousand guilders on a paid up basis for the Ken-en 
Bank. 17 Furthermore, the BOT required that Quek Chun-yong accept other potential 
investors from Java, Taiwan, and Singapore, such as Oei Tiong-ham.18 Quek Chun-yong 
disagreed and distrusted the BOT, so both sides ceased negotiations in early October. 
 
4. Establishment of the CSB 
Meanwhile, the BOT already made concrete plans for the GOCB and published the 
“Outline of the Overseas Chinese Bank (Alias Southeast Asian Bank)” in November 1915, 
both in Japanese and Chinese languages.  
This proposal suggested that the BOT arrange enough capital from Japanese and 
Chinese investors, then establish which market territory in Southeast Asia would be used for 
the GOCB, and build close connections not only with major banks in South China and Japan, 
but also with small and medium-sized native banks in the territory to promote remittance 
business.19 The GOCB would be a joint venture with Overseas Chinese and Japanese who 
were the leading merchants and business organizations from Singapore, Penang, Rangoon, 
Padang, Batavia, Surabaya, Banjarmasin, Makassar, Bangkok, Saigon, Hanoi, Manila, Hong 
Kong, Canton, Swatow, Amoy, Fuchou, Shanghai, Taipei, Kobe, Osaka, Yokohama, and 
Tokyo.20 The capital was 30 million Japanese yen equivalent and the first payed up capital 
was 7.5 million Japanese yen equivalent.21 They would provide not only commercial banking 
services, but also bond issuing and underwriting, syndicate loan underwriting, and 
trustees.22 
However, the BOT needed three more years to finalize the project. Negotiations with 
Quek Chun-yong had already ceased, and it was difficult to find the appropriate Overseas 
Chinese leaders who were able to work with diversified and complicated Chinese networks 
between Southeast Asia and South China. Moreover, the BOT had to arrange official 
support from the Japanese government. Yagyu had been prevailed on by politicians and 
bureaucrats about the raison d’etre of the GOCB after his resignation as president in 1916.23 
His successors, such as President Tetsutaro Sakurai (櫻井鐵太郎) and Vice President 
Nakagawa, also did their best to realize the project.  
                                                        
17 BOT 1915.8.31. 
18 BOT 1915.8.31. 
19 BOT 1915, 25.  
20 BOT 1915, 26. 
21 BOT 1915, 23. 
22 BOT 1915, 24. 
23 BOT 1930, 4. 
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In June 1917, the BOT published another report titled “Overseas Chinese in Southeast 
Asia and Their Financial Institutions” and proposed to establish the GOCB once again. In 
this report, the BOT added another function to the GOCB as a financial service provider for 
Japanese merchants and companies in Southeast Asia. During the period of the First World 
War, Japan advanced into Southeast Asian markets, and were heavily involved in trading, 
plantations, and the mining business. However, there was a lack of financial institutions to 
support their activities, and the GOCB was expected to play a role as a short or long term 
credit provider for Overseas Japanese business.  
In March 1918, the BOT hosted the “Conference for Establishing the CSB” and invited 
government officials from the MOF, MOFA, and TGO. They discussed detailed business 
plans and the contents of the Memorandum and Articles of Association. The most important 
issue in this conference was regarding jurisdiction of the bank, and they finally decided that 
the bank should rely on Japanese law, so they set up the head office in Taipei.24 The GOCB 
was finally implemented under the name of the CSB.  
The BOT had already selected Lim Him-ting (林熊徴), a patriarch of the leading 
Taiwanese noble house Lim Clan of Pang-kio (板橋林家) as a suitable founder for the CSB. 
The BOT expected him to become a mediator between Japanese and Overseas Chinese. The 
committee to establish the CSB released the prospectus and started share subscriptions. A 
total of 100,000 shares were allotted to Japan (10%), Taiwan (40%), and China or Southeast 
Asia (50%).25 This shareholding structure reflected the concept of the GOCB as a joint 
venture between Japanese and Chinese capitals in South China and Southeast Asia. 
The CSB officially completed company registration in January 22, 1919, and held a 
founding shareholders meeting in January 29 in Taipei. At this meeting, 15 directors, 7 
auditors, 25 counselors, and 3 advisors were elected. They came from Japan (12%), Taiwan 
(34%), South China, including Shanghai, Fuchou, Amoy, Canton, and Hong Kong (30%), 
and Southeast Asia, including Singapore, Manila, Rangoon, Semarang, Surabaya, and Solo 
(24%). 26  Lim Him-ting was appointed as president, Jyokichi Ikeda (池田常吉 ) was 
appointed as vice president, Sankuro Ogasawara (小笠原三九郎) and two more Japanese 
were appointed as senior managing director and managing directors. However, Lim 
Him-ting was the nominal executive, and four Japanese executives and many clerks who 
came from the BOT controlled managerial decisions and daily operations.  
    In March 1919, the CSB opened its head office in Taipei, then opened offices in 
Singapore, Semarang, Canton, Rangoon, Saigon, and Haiphong within a year. The CSB 
                                                        
24 BOT 1930, 4.  
25 Chugai Shogyo Shinpo 1919.2.2.  
26 Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpo 1919.1.30. 
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continuously increased paid up capital and reached up to 7.5 million yen by 1921.  
 
5. Establishment of the SWC 
When the BOT promoted the CSB project, another joint venture project to establish the 
SWC was already in progress. In spite of the rapid trade volume increase with South China 
and Southeast Asia, only foreign warehouses and banks provided services to Japanese 
merchants, but these services were not flexible enough or useful to them. Therefore, small 
Japanese traders such as Nanyo Shokai, led by Kazue Tsutsumibayashi, and Arima Yoko (有
馬洋行), led by Hikokichi Arima (有馬彦吉), lobbied for the TGO and BOT to establish 
Japanese warehouse businesses in Southeast Asia. 27  The TGO and BOT had already 
established Taiwan Warehouse & Co. (台湾倉庫) in 1916 in Taiwan, and continuously 
researched the feasibility of Japanese warehouse businesses in South China and Southeast 
Asia to expand Japanese economic presence in the region.  
When the BOT finalized the CSB project, BOT Vice President Nakagawa, who led the 
project, conceived of an idea to establish a joint venture warehouse company with Overseas 
Chinese which would apply the same human and capital resources of the CSB. Taiwan’s 
governor, Motojiro Akashi (明石元二郎), supported this idea, and the BOT started to 
organize the SWC project.28 Lim Him-ting was selected again as the founder of the SWC, 
and the prospectus for the project insisted on a close relationship with the CSB:  
 
The CSB was established with the cooperation of leading merchants and organizations 
in South China, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, and was a significant case of economic 
cooperation between Japanese and Overseas Chinese. We believed that this was the 
right time and opportunity to realize this project and establish the SWC as soon as 
possible with support from leading businesses and social figures in the region who also 
supported the establishment of the CSB.29 
 
    Obviously, this project was tied with the CSB under the same concept of economic 
cooperation and joint ventures between Japanese and Overseas Chinese capitals. Chapter 3 
of the prospectus also mentioned the following:  
 
This company is a joint venture between Japanese and Chinese. Chinese include the 
people who are Chinese nationals or Overseas Chinese in South China and Southeast 
                                                        
27 SWC 1936, 87.  
28 SWC 1936, 87. 
29 SWC 1919, 3. 
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Asia. Japanese include organizations, traders, and businessmen who have strong 
relationships with Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Anyone who is a director or shareholder 
of the CSB has priority to enjoy the share allotments of the SWC.30 
 
The prospectus noted that the total capital was 5 million Japanese yen and the first 
payed up capital was 1.25 million Japanese yen. A total 50,000 share allotments were 
completed in November 1919. Japanese shareholders held 35.7% (17,850 shares) and 
Chinese (including Taiwanese, Mainland Chinese, and Overseas Chinese) shareholders held 
64.3% (32,150 shares).31 Geographical shareholding allocation was as follows; 62% from 
Japan and Taiwan (30,950 shares, 44 shareholders), 22% from Dutch East India (11,000 
shares, 27 shareholders), 9% from Singapore (4,550 shares, 31 shareholders), and 7% from 
Canton (3,500 shares, 28 shareholders).32 The largest shareholder was the BOT (2,450 
shares, 4.9%), then Quek Chun-yong’s holding company (2,000 shares, 4%), the CSB 
(1,000 shares, 2%), Mitsui & Co. (三井物産, 1,000 shares, 2%), and Yamashita Shipping (山
下汽船, 1,000 shares, 2%).33 
The SWC held a founding shareholders meeting in Taipei in January 15, 1920. At the 
meeting, 9 directors, 3 auditors, 22 counselors, and 2 advisors were elected.34 The 12 board 
members included 4 Japanese, 5 Taiwanese, 1 Chinese, and 2 Overseas Chinese. Counselors 
and advisors included 15 Japanese, 5 Taiwanese, 1 Chinese, and 3 Overseas Chinese. 
Moreover, 19 members were stakeholders of the CSB (including 7 directors, 5 auditors, 2 
advisors, and 5 counselors), and 12 members came from the BOT. These figures clearly 
indicate that the SWC was affiliated with the BOT and CSB. Lim Hian-tong (林獻堂) and 
Gan Hun-lian (顔雲年) were appointed as president and vice president, respectively. Both of 
them were patriarchs of the Lim Clan of Bu-hong (霧峰林家) and the Gan Clan of Ke-lang 
(基隆顔家), the leading noble houses in northern and central Taiwan. Sayao Kawakata (河方
靭男, former Osaka branch general manager of Mitsubishi Warehouse Co. (三菱倉庫)) was 
appointed senior managing director in charge of managerial operations, and six more 
directors were appointed, included Lim Him-ting of the CSB, Etsuji Yanagi of the BOT, and 
Kazue Tsutsumibayasahi of Nanyo Shokai in Java 
    By December 1919, a month before the founding shareholders meeting, the SWC had 
already sent correspondents to Canton, Singapore, and Java to prepare for opening of their 
                                                        
30 SWC 1919, 5. 
31 SWC 1936, 12-16. 
32 SWC 1936, 12-16. 
33 SWC 1936, 12-16. 
34 SWC 1936, 102-103. 
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business. They opened warehouses in Semarang in March 1920, Surabaya and Canton in 
April, and Singapore in May. Kawakata was in charge of the Taipei head office and Canton 
branch, Tsutsumibayasahi was in charge of Java and Singapore, and Yanagi was in charge of 
liaisons between the SWC and BOT. However, there was not enough managerial consensus 
among the three managing directors due to hasty preparations during the company’s 
establishment. Moreover, Kawakata had a talent for running a warehouse business, but did 
not have any practical knowledge about overseas operations. In addition, Tsutsumibayasahi 
had to manage his own business, Nanyo Shokai, in Java, and Yanagi was a manager at the 
BOT’s secretarial office and held a position at the SWC, which was a concurrent post.35 
These factors caused serious managerial problems soon after establishment of the company. 
 
6. Limits and restructuring 
However, both the CSB and SWC faced difficulties and had limitations during business 
development in the early stages. Because of anti-Japanese boycotts from the middle of 1919, 
business cooperation with Chinese merchants stagnated, and export trade from Japan was 
negatively influenced. Since 1920, Japan had been experiencing a serious economic 
depression. Moreover, the political situation in South China was extremely unstable due to 
struggles between warlords, and commodity prices in Southeast Asia had dropped with 
volatility. These negative economic and political factors seriously affected business for the 
CSB and SWC.  
The CSB posted a 139,037 yen profit in fiscal 1919 and 366,386 yen profit in fiscal 1920, 
but there were some rumors that the BOT was hiding bad loans in their subsidiaries, such as 
the CSB. Sankuro Ogasawara, managing director of the CSB recounted the following story 
in his memoir: 
 
I frequently received bad rumors from Taiwan that said we shoulder the bad loans 
from the BOT. At the time, the BOT was affected by an increase in non-performing 
loans due to the depression, and some insiders reported this to the MOF. 
Management expected that the MOF would inspect the account books sooner or later. 
They were embarrassed and tried to hide the non-performing loans from us to dodge 
responsibility.36 
 
Based on a special inspection in June 1921, the MOF ordered corrective measures to the 
CSB’s operations, but there was no drastic change to their management. In addition, 
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financial results continued to be sluggish with 296,768 yen in profits in fiscal 1921 and 
318,417 yen in profits in fiscal 1922.  
In April 1922, the BOT announced that it was changing its business model from general 
banking to exchange banking, and that it would cease to supply development finance. In 
response to this, the MOF, BOJ, and BOT discussed changing the CSB’s business model 
from general banking institutions for Overseas Chinese clients to development finance 
institutions for Japanese clients. The CSB started business restructuring in September 1924 
and reduced 50% of their capital, disposing of more than 4 million yen in non-performing 
loans, and posting a 3.74 million yen final deficit in fiscal 1924.37 However, it was not easy 
to establish a new business model in South China and Southeast Asia because of the negative 
macro-economic and political environment, in addition to there being not enough support 
from the BOT and the Japanese government.  
The SWC was in a difficult situation as well. Because of hasty preparations during the 
establishment stage, the BOT and SWC’s managing directors could not come to a consensus 
regarding its management. The SWC recruited staff with high salaries from Mitsubishi 
Warehouse Co., including Sayao Kawakata as senior managing director, but it also raised 
operating costs.38 However, they were not aware that the local market in South China and 
Southeast Asia had posted a loss of 140,378 yen in fiscal 1920. In response to this, President 
Nakagawa of the BOT suggested that the SWC task Japanese national interests, and said its 
mission was to promote cooperation with Overseas Chinese as a key to the southward 
strategy, therefore, the SWC needed to change attitudes and operations. 39  Kawakata 
resigned as senior managing director and Yanagi from the BOT took over his position. 
Under the leaderhip of Yanagi and Tsutsumibayashi, the SWC restructured its operational 
and financial management, barely posting 5,311 yen in profit in fiscal 1921, and recording 
55,784 yen in profit in fiscal 1922. 
In May 1923, the SWC moved its operational headquarters to Singapore and expanded 
warehouses and ancillary services. The handling amount for the warehousing business was 
steadily increasing; input was 11,865,000 yen and output was 12,962,000 yen in fiscal 1921, 
but 33,611,000 yen and 34,881,000 yen in fiscal 1925. However, financial results were at a 
standstill, and they posted a loss of 4,941 yen in fiscal 1923, and profits of 5,560 yen in fiscal 
1924 and 5,279 yen in fiscal 1925. Under these circumstances, Overseas Chinese directors 
and shareholders gradually began to lose interest in the SWC. In February 1926, 
Tsutsumibayashi reported to the directors of the BOT, “Since our establishment in 1920, the 
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SWC has not paid any dividends, and Chinese shareholders would like to release their shares. 
The share price of the company has dropped to 2 yen per share in the Taipei market, and the 
SWC has lost credibility in the Overseas Chinese business society. It is my deepest regret to 
say this, but they have already lost their confidence in the SWC.”40 
 
7. Structural problems of the CSB and SWC 
In search of reasons why the CSB and SWC faced difficulties in their business 
development, we were able to find four major structural problems. 
1) The fall of the BOT 
The BOT was the de facto parent company of both the CSB and SWC. However, the 
BOT’s business operations and financial position drastically deteriorated after 1920 because 
of a serious depression after the First World War. In April 1922, the BOT announced 
changes to its business model from a general banking institution to an exchange banking 
institution, however, their deterioration had been worsening day by day, especially after the 
Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923.  
The BOT posted record profits of 3,100,325 yen in fiscal 1920, but it was followed by a 
downward trend in profits of 1,371,440 yen in fiscal 1924. In particular, the BOT posted a 
huge loss of 26,493,197 yen in the first half of fiscal 1925. The balance sheet also reflected 
the difficulties of their financial position. The loan-deposit ratio indicated extreme 
over-lending. This was caused by a rapid increase in bill discount operations, which recorded 
227,337,996 yen in fiscal 1920 to 408,055,514 yen in fiscal 1925. The only way that the BOT 
could cover its shortage of funds was with borrowing. The total debt accounts balance 
drastically increased from 165,915,893 yen in fiscal 1920 to 460,486,148 yen in fiscal 1925.  
Their financial position was strained by serious irregularities, such as the need to take 
tens of millions in coal loans to cover their fixed lending. Finally, the BOT temporally closed 
its doors in 1927. Due to the shortage of funds and deterioration caused by a wrong business 
strategy, the BOT began losing its capacity to support the CSB and SWC.  
2) Dependence on subsidies from the TGO 
The CSB and SWC over-depended on subsidies from the TGO. For example, the CSB 
received 75,000 yen in fiscal 1919, 66,000 yen in fiscal 1920, 100,000 yen each from fiscal 
1921 to 1924, and 70,000 yen in fiscal 1925. It covered 22% of annual profits in fiscal 1919, 
10% of profits in fiscal 1920, 17% of profits in fiscal 1921, 16% of profits in fiscal 1922, 16% 
of profits in fiscal 1923, 3% of losses in fiscal 1924, and 39% of profits in fiscal 1925. Until 
the end of fiscal 1935, the TGO subsidized a total of 1.31 million yen to the CSB. 
The SWC also received 50,000 yen each from fiscal 1920 to 1924, and 12,500 yen in 
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fiscal 1925. This covered 26% of annual losses in fiscal 1920, 112% of losses in fiscal 1921, 
90% of profits in fiscal 1922, 91% of losses in fiscal 1923, 113% of losses in fiscal 1924, and 
173% of losses in fiscal 1925. Due to these subsidies, the SWC could ease their losses or 
even make a slight profit. The TGO subsidized a total of 420,000 yen to the SWC until the 
end of fiscal 1930. Relatively speaking, the profits and losses of both the CSB and SWC were 
heavily dependent on the subsidies they received from the TGO.  
3) Abnormal dividends policy 
As with the joint venture with Overseas Chinese capitals, the CSB and SWC believed 
that they had to respect Chinese commercial customs, especially in their dividends policy. 
Traditionally, Chinese merchants invested their idle capitals in joint stock businesses (合股). 
However, such investments have another aspect as fixed deposits and business proprietors 
have to pay certain percentages of dividends as de facto annual interest (官利) even if they 
make a profit or have losses. When the CSB and SWC invited Chinese investors for share 
subscriptions, both companies did not officially promise fixed dividends, but suggested it. 
Therefore, even though their corporate format was like a western style joint stock company, 
the CSB and SWC had to pay dividends under the abnormal policy to defend their 
reputation and credit.  
For example, the CSB paid 174,000 yen in dividends in fiscal 1919, 520,000 yen in fiscal 
1920, 450,000 yen from fiscal 1921 to 1923, and 188,000 yen in fiscal 1924. It was equivalent 
to 78% of annual profits in fiscal 1919, 81% in fiscal 1920, 77% in fiscal 1921, 71% in fiscal 
1922, 70% in fiscal 1923, and 83% in the first half year of fiscal 1924. The CSB recorded 
huge losses in the second half of fiscal 1924 and was forced to pass its dividends, but started 
to pay again with 150,000 yen in fiscal 1925, which was equivalent to 83% of its annual 
profits. After a special inspection by the MOF in June 1921, the CSB received corrective 
instructions to reduce its dividend rate. Sankuro Ogasawara, senior managing director of the 
CSB, insisted, “Once we cut dividends, it will distract from our credit, and Chinese 
stakeholders might panic. As a banking institution, it is a suicidal act.”41 However, the CSB 
compromised with the MOF and kept their dividend policy, instead of having Ogasawara 
resign. 
The SWC was in a different situation because they made huge losses in the first fiscal 
year and could not implement dividends. Executive Director Kazue Tsutsumibayashi 
mentioned in January 1921 that, “This Company is a joint venture with Japanese and 
Chinese to promote international economic cooperation. However, even though we are in 
charge of management, we recorded huge net losses within a year and could not implement 
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dividends. This is a terrible situation for Chinese investors.”42 He worried that the SWC and 
Japanese would lose face, as well as credit, among Chinese business society in South China 
and Southeast Asia, and that it would cause difficulties for economic cooperation with 
Chinese merchants. However, financial results after fiscal 1920 were also unstable, and the 
SWC could not implement dividends.  
Because of the excess recognition regarding Chinese commercial customs, this 
abnormal dividends policy took away their managerial and financial flexibility and hurt their 
relationship with Chinese stakeholders. 
4) Misunderstandings about Overseas Chinese  
The driving cause of the CSB and SWC was to promote economic cooperation with 
Overseas Chinese capitals for Japanese economic expansion toward the south. However, the 
BOT, CSB, and SWC fatally misunderstood Overseas Chinese. Overseas Chinese who have 
origins in South China are very loyal to clan kinship and have provincial relationships inside 
their circles. In other words, they do not easily trust or cooperate with others, whether their 
counterpart is Chinese or not. 
The BOT originally recognized and were cautious about this behavior. Their reports 
claimed, “An adverse effect of Chinese society is that they have strong emotions to kinship 
and regionalism, and do not cooperate with others. This is a point worth noting when 
establishing joint venture banks.”43 Therefore, establishing the CSB and SWC was an 
experimental project. Their report also said, “We will try to establish a company which 
encourages Overseas Chinese to change their bad habits as they struggle with each other, 
and organize a new movement to unite them.”44 In line with this concept, the CSB and SWC 
invited Overseas Chinese stakeholders from various places in South China and Southeast 
Asia. However, it could not create any actual business opportunities or synergistic effects 
among them.  
Moreover, many Overseas Chinese did not agree with the “same script, same race” (同文
同種) ideology of the Japanese due to anti-Japanese sentiments, and only opportunists or 
semi-forced collaborators among them cooperated with the CSB and SWC. The projects of 
the CSB and SWC were highly ideal for the Japanese, but were too optimistic or unrealistic 
for Overseas Chinese.  
 
8. Changing the relationship with the BOT 
In spite of the founding cause of the CSB and SWC, both companies gradually lost their 
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purpose as a joint venture with Overseas Chinese. The CSB changed their business model in 
1924 and officially ceased development of business operations with Overseas Chinese. The 
SWC still sought business relationships with Overseas Chinese on a customer basis, but 
could not cooperate with them on a project basis.  
On the other hand, the relationships among the BOT, CSB, and SWC gradually 
deteriorated, especially after the BOT temporally closed its door in 1927. The BOT resumed 
its business operations under government intervention, but no longer had the capacity to 
support overseas business development in the south under the business restructuring. 
Therefore, the CSB and SWC set off on their own paths under the leadership of a new top 
management.  
The SWC changed its top management in 1926. Jisaburo Handa (半田治三郎), a former 
general manager at the BOT’s Batavia branch, assumed the role of senior managing director. 
Because of his close contact with the SWC, he understood the problems that the company 
was facing and reformed its management where possible. For example, the SWC obtained 
the authorization and guarantee to re-discount their warehouse receipts by the Javasche 
Bank, the de facto central bank in Dutch East India, in 1927. The SWC also built state of the 
art mega warehouses at the quay front of Surabaya port in 1928, even though they faced 
heavy opposition by Dutch capitals.45 However, the economic and political difficulties have 
not changed since the early 1920s and it has affected the financial results of the SWC, which 
only posted 3,410 yen in profits in fiscal 1926, 6,324 yen in profits in fiscal 1927, and 2,283 
yen in profits in fiscal 1928, with a recorded 19,287 yen in losses in fiscal 1929.  
Therefore, Handa decided to introduce outside capital for the coming business 
restructuring. In 1930, Hiroichiro Ishihara (石原廣一郎), a successful entrepreneur and 
mining tycoon in Malaya, had interest in the ownership of the SWC. He had been a student 
at the Kyoto Law School (京都法政学校) and received tutelage by President Nakagawa of 
the BOT when Nakagawa was a chancellor of the school. He was an enthusiastic believer in 
Japan’s southward strategy and dedicated himself to developing iron ore mines in Malaya, 
which received strong support from Nakagawa and the BOT.46 He also started to expand his 
shipping business to Java in the late 1920s, and was therefore offered a buyout of the SWC.47 
Handa and Ishihara agreed to a plan for a buyout and restructuring in late 1929, but the 
BOT opposed it because of the matter of a loan recovery from the SWC. Finally, the TGO 
mediated on the issue, and the BOT accepted the offer from Ishihara in August 1930. After 
capital decrease and increase operations, Ishihara owned 53.46% of shares after the BOT 
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sold all shares in April 1931. After this transaction, Lim Hian-tong remained in his position 
as president, but resigned in 1935, and the SWC became a Japanese company both in name 
and reality. However, their business was seriously affected by the rise of political and 
economic conflicts between Japan and the Netherlands in the late 1930s. After the breakout 
of the Asia-Pacific War (太平洋戦争) in 1941, the SWC continued their business operations 
in the Japanese-occupied East Indies and other South East Asian territories, but they lost all 
business interests after the end of the war in 1945.  
The CSB could not set a clear direction for development after their business 
restructuring in 1924, and faced liquidity problems soon after the BOT temporally closed its 
doors in 1927. However, the TGO realized that a temporary closure of the CSB would create 
a huge negative impact on Overseas Japanese businesses and damage their credibility in 
Southeast Asia, in addition to causing unrest among Taiwanese stakeholders. Therefore, 
under the instructions of the TGO, the CSB implemented an emergency restructuring plan 
including a 50% capital decrease and 3 million yen emergency loan from the BOJ.48 Due to 
this drastic restructuring plan, balance sheets and financial results became stable since the 
second half of 1929. However, the CSB had already lost its significance to the GOCB, since 
only second-class Japanese trading houses or businessmen used its financial services. 
Benzaburo Arita (有田勉三郎), who controlled the CSB as vice president starting in 1928, 
said:  
 
It is very rare to see Chinese or Indian customers in our banks because our service is 
mainly aimed at providing for Japanese customers. However, major Japanese traders and 
companies use the YSB and BOT, and we only get second-class traders or businessmen 
as customers.49 
 
On the other hand, the drastic business restructuring by the BOT and CSB caused a 
huge negative impact on Japanese businesses in Southeast Asia. In particular, rubber and 
hemp plantations in Malaya, Sumatra, and the Philippines had already received a devastating 
blow due to a decline in commodity prices, but could not receive financial support from the 
BOT and CSB. Therefore, the TGO implemented a financial rescue scheme in 1929. Under 
this scheme, the CSB finances totaled 3 million yen for Japanese planters, and the TGO 
subsidized 58% in interest payments, then the CSB received a total of 825,215 yen from the 
TGO from 1929 to 1934.50 However, because of the global economic crisis that began in 
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1929, finances to Japanese planters turned to non-performing loans, and the treasury bureau 
of the TGO put pressure on the CSB to do another business restructuring. Makoto Okada 
(岡田信), treasury bureau chief who had experience inspecting the CSB in 1921 as a chief 
inspector from the MOF, doubted the raison d'etre of the CSB as a Japanese financial 
institution in Southeast Asia, and criticized Arita’s leadership.51 Finally, the BOT, which 
lost control over the CSB, even though they were the largest shareholder, intervened and 
created a restructuring scheme in 1936.52 However, Arita resisted and bought time against 
the BOT.  
While in the era of the Japanese-Sino War (日中戦争) and Asia-Pacific War, the CSB 
reemphasized their raison d’etre as a Japanese financial institution in the south in line with 
Japanese militaristic advances as part of national policy. However, the war deteriorated the 
economic situation and broke down the normal business environment, especially in the 
colonies of the Western powers. The CSB extended its branch network in Japanese-occupied 
areas in South China and Southeast Asia, but there were no profitable business opportunities 
to be found from this expansion. The only profit source was in banking businesses on the 
island of Taiwan, which enjoyed a relatively stabled economic situation apart from being part 
of the war zone. After 1944, the BOT finally carried out a business restructuring of the CSB 
due to the deterioration of the war situation in Southeast Asia. They dismissed Arita from his 
position as vice president, then increased capital, acquired majority shares, and sent 
directors to control the CSB.53 The CSB closed its overseas branches and turned its business 
model to focus on local banks in Taiwan. In August 1945, the CSB was confiscated by the 
Chinese government after the end of the Asia-Pacific War, and closed its 26 year history as a 
Japanese bank.  
 
9. Conclusion 
The CSB and SWC were established as affiliate companies of the BOT which aimed to 
facilitate market entry into the south by Japanese capitals through economic cooperation 
with Overseas Chinese. It was planned in the middle of the 1910s when the BOT faced 
difficulties developing businesses in Mainland China and turned their target toward 
Southeast Asia. At the same time, Japan enjoyed a booming economy during the First World 
War, and Japanese capitals had begun massively seeking opportunities in overseas markets, 
especially in the south under the socio-political/economic trends of the Southward 
Movement. In line with this background, the BOT established the CSB and SWC in 1919 
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and 1920, respectively.  
However, both companies faced managerial difficulties due to weak corporate 
governance, lack of sufficient support from the BOT, a depression in South China and 
Southeast Asia, and a nominal “partnership” with Overseas Chinese. They could not create 
any actual business opportunities or synergistic effects with Overseas Chinese, and gradually 
lost their original goal as a joint venture. On the other hand, the BOT’s rapid expansionism 
failed in the early 1920s under the serious depression following the First World War, and 
they temporarily closed their doors in 1927. The affiliation among the BOT, CSB, and SWC 
gradually broke down and they separated in the late 1920s. 
Both the CSB and SWC targeted wider and combined markets between South China to 
Southeast Asia, and they introduced many sources of stakeholders as directors and 
shareholders from Japan, Taiwan, South China, and Southeast Asia. Therefore, the projects 
had a significant meaning as an international joint venture, and had a goal to create a new 
age of commercial activity in Asia. However, the macro-economic environment had been 
changing since 1920 when both companies were established, and they faced the realities and 
limitations of business development. In other words, both the CSB and SWC were “belated” 
products of the age of the Southward Movement in the 1910s.  
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